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Abstract
Several authors in the scope of Secret Sharing have tried to obtain and improve
bounds for both the information ratio and average information ratio of access struc-
tures. Following that topic, this work deals with the optimization of these two
parameters when considering secret sharing schemes for access structures on 5 and
6 participants. First, access structures with 5 participants will be considered, and
then it will follow a study on the ones on 6 participants that are based on graphs.
The main goal of the paper is to check existing lower bounds (and improve some of
them) by using linear programs with the sage solver. The technique used is based
on the combinatorial method presented by Crismaz [11], which has been used as
well in other articles in order to find better bounds for these parameters. Shannon
information inequalities have been used to translate the polymatroid axioms into
linear constraints that were included in the programs in order to find the desired
bounds. Some upper bounds have been found for these parameters as well, using a
decomposition method that was presented previously by Stinson [33].
3
4
Contents
1 Introduction 7
2 Secret Sharing, Matroids and Polymatroids 13
2.1 Matroids and Polymatroids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Shannon Entropy and Entropic Polymatroids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Secret Sharing Schemes and Access Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Linear Secret Sharing Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3 Parameters to be optimized 23
3.1 State of the Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Improving the linear programming approach to the optimization of
the information ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4 New approach for calculating the bounds 29
4.1 Non-Shannon Information Inequalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5 Access structures based on graphs 37
5
6 CONTENTS
Chapter 1
Introduction
Secret Sharing refers to methods used to distribute a secret value among a group
of participants. It is one of the widely studied topics in cryptography nowadays.
It is a fundamental tool for some of the latest and more complex applications of
cryptography. For example, it can be applied when using distributed signatures. A
signature is a hash value (value computed mathematically from plain text that has
always the same length) calculated from a message that is encrypted with a secret
key S. Asymmetric cryptography, a set of techniques in cryptography that are based
on the existence of two different keys, is used when encrypting S. The two keys are
the private key (one or few holders) and the public key (distributed among several
users). If one message (or hash value, when signing a message) is encrypted with
the private key it has to be decrypted with the public one, and vice versa. So when
one talks about distributed signatures, the objective is that several co-certifiers sign
a message without imposing any signing order over them. The signers can share the
secret key as a secret value and then secret sharing can be adopted. The signers
will not know the key separately, but if they join together the share of each of them,
they will be able to retrieve the key and encrypt the message as it was needed. This
is only one example, but there are a lot more useful applications of secret sharing
nowadays: Byzantine agreement [1], threshold cryptography[3], access control [4],
attribute-based encryption [5]...
Its main application, however, is the so-called Secure Multi-party Computation
[6, 7] which has been the big motivation for the development and study of secret
sharing. Nowadays, it is regular for individuals and companies to encounter situa-
tions in which private data is a very valuable resource. So, imagine one needs to
do some computation with this valuable data but does not trust everyone involved
in the operation. In a secure multi-party computation, secret sharing can be used
in order to protect everyone’s data: each party can spread the data in different
fragments so that all together they hold full information, yet no individual party
has all the information. A very interesting fact that makes this problem even more
important is that there are many situations in which a large amount of added value
can be obtained when combining confidential information from several sources and
computing some result that holds interest for all parties. This happens for example
in benchmarking, data mining,... So it can be seen that there is a real need for
secret sharing, a need that is bigger every day. This was the main motivation for
this work, as the need for these techniques make secret sharing an up to date and
very important topic.
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Figure 1.1: Secret Sharing Scheme example 1.
Following the topic of secret sharing, there are some important concepts related
to it which the reader should become familiar with in order to understand this work.
A secret sharing scheme is a method that allows some secret information, called the
secret to be protected in a communication between a set P of different participants.
This is achieved by assigning to each participant a small share, a piece of related
information, in such way that only some subsets of them can recover the secret
value by joining their shares. The subsets of participants that are able to recover the
secret are called the qualified subsets, whereas the ones that cannot recompose it are
called unqualified subsets. The qualified subsets of a secret sharing scheme compose
the access structure of such scheme. The first examples of mathematically based
secret sharing schemes were given by Blakley [9] and Shamir [31]. They presented
a very useful type of secret sharing schemes called threshold schemes. Their most
distinguishable characteristic is that the qualified subsets of the access structure
include all sets of more than t players, for some threshold value t. Threshold secret
sharing schemes have also found numerous applications in cryptography. In most of
these applications, one tries to use the “best” known scheme for the access structure
at hand. There is a small explanation of Blakley and Shamir solutions for the Secret
Sharing problem in [2], which goes deeper into threshold secret sharing schemes as
well.
Secret sharing schemes can be defined from several geometrical figures, such as
matroids, polymatroids or graphs. Matroids and polymatroids are the most common
ones, and they are defined as a pair of a set and a function that meet some particular
requirements (this will be explained later).
One of the ways of measuring the efficiency of a secret sharing scheme is the
so-called (average) information ratio. These parameters can be calculated for every
secret sharing scheme that can be used for an access structure (there are many
secret sharing schemes that have the same access structure). They are defined as
the (average) ratio between the maximum length of the shares of every participant
and the length of the secret. The optimal information ratio of an access structure
Γ is defined as the infimum of the information ratios of all secret sharing schemes
for Γ. The optimal average information ratio is defined analogously. They are
usually represented as σ(Γ) and by σ˜(Γ). The computation of these parameters is
one of the most important open problems in secret sharing nowadays. Although
it is true that some partial results have been found, there are still some important
questions that remain unsolved. Due to the difficulty of finding general results,
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this problem has been considered for many different families of access structures in
[8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 24, 25] among other works. One of the greatest achievements
has been made by Csirmaz and Tardos [14] who determined the optimal information
ratio for all access structures that are defined by trees. As it is an up to date
issue that has no defined solution, the objective of this paper is to provide better
lower bounds regarding the optimization of this parameters, despite that it will be
commented how upper bounds can be found and some examples will be given. This
optimization results in shorter shares for every participant within a secret sharing
scheme, which is why their value is used to measure the efficiency of the scheme.
Linear secret sharing scheme are an interesting type of secret sharing scheme due
to their homomorphic properties, which are important for some of the applications
of secret sharing (such as secure multi-party computation). In a linear secret sharing
scheme, the secret value and the shares are vectors over some finite field, and the
shares of the participants are values of a given linear map over some random vector.
Linear secret sharing schemes are obtained by applying some of the best-known tech-
niques to construct efficient schemes, such as the decomposition method by Stinson
[33]. When studying linear schemes, it is interesting to define new parameters λ(Γ)
and λ˜(Γ), which correspond to the infimum of the (average) information ratios of
all linear secret sharing schemes for Γ. Obviously, σ(Γ) ≤ λ(Γ). Actually, almost all
known upper bounds on the optimal information ratio are upper bounds on λ(Γ),
and the same applies to the corresponding parameters for the average optimal in-
formation ratio. Even though non-linear secret sharing schemes have been proved
to have lower information ratios in general, there are not many known examples of
access structures with σ(Γ) < λ(Γ).
On the other hand, Csirmaz [11] explained that most of the lower bounds for
the optimal information ratio have been found by using a combinatorial method
based on the connection between the Shannon entropy and polymatroids, which
was presented by Fujishige in [20]. The best known asymptotic lower bound was
obtained in [11] by using this method. The parameter κ(Γ) was introduced in [25]
(and will be used in this paper as well) to denote the best lower bound on σ(Γ) that
can be obtained by using this technique. In fact, so far it has been checked that
κ(Γ) = λ(Γ) for all access structures whose optimal complexity has been determined.
This is a consequence of the techniques used until now. The combinatorial method
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Figure 1.3: Example of some access structures on 6 participants defined by graphs.
has been used in several works to provide lower bounds on κ, which result in lower
bounds in σ. It was used for example in [24] and in [29]. However, the decomposition
methods usually result in linear secret sharing schemes and hence, bounds (upper
bounds) in λ.
This method can be formalized as a linear program, which is the strategy that has
been followed for this work. Together, polymatroids and access structures define the
feasible region for the linear programs used when computing the lower bounds on the
information ratio (all of this will be further explained later on). This is the scheme
followed in order to get the results presented here: First, polymatroids axioms have
been translated into linear constraints using their connection with Shannon entropy.
Then these constraints have been used, together with the conditions of access struc-
ture, to define the feasible region of the linear programs. Finally, these programs
have been executed using the Sage solver and the bounds have been computed. In
the interest of simplification, only perfect or unconditionally secure secret sharing
schemes are going to be considered. A secret sharing scheme is said to be perfect if
the members in unqualified subsets cannot get any information of the secret. This
kind of secret sharing schemes are easier to study as every subset that is not qualified
is forbidden. Besides, this work has focused on access structures with only 5 and 6
participants, and especially on upgrading the lower bounds for the information ratio
for those access structures.
Jackson and Martin [24] used both the combinatorial method and the decom-
position method explained before in order to find lower and upper bounds for all
access structures on 5 participants. They were able to determine the exact value
of the information ratio for almost all of this access structures. In particular, the
exact value of the information ratio was obtained for the ones that had the lower
bound equal to the upper bound. They did all the calculations manually but, for
the purposes of this work, new linear programs are used when calculating the lower
bounds. This programs were first used in [29] and it was possible to improve some of
the bounds given by Jackson and Martin. Using this approach, all the lower bounds
presented in [24] were checked by translating the polymatroid axioms into linear
constraints. That is, using only the Shannon information inequalities. However,
as it was discovered later some of the bounds Jackson and Martin found can be
improved by effectively adding new information or rank inequalities. Therefore, for
some of the access structures which optimal information ratio had not been found
yet, constraints using non-Shannon information inequalities were defined. Including
these new constraints in the linear programs, it was possible to improve some of the
bounds presented in [24], as it was done by Carles Padró, Leonor Vàzquez and An
Yang in [29]. Basically, the strategy followed for the proof of the Ingleton’s inequal-
ity (although the inequality itself was not used because it did not work properly
with the programs) was implemented.
This work is divided into three parts. The first one will provide an introduction
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to secret sharing, including all the concepts presented in this chapter and their
mathematical definition. The linear programs that have been used to check the
lower bounds given by Jackson and Martin as well as the lower bounds given by
Van Dijk [15] for graph-based access structures, will also be explained in this part.
Then, it will follow an explanation of the new constraints used to improve some of
the results presented by Jackson and Martin. Finally the last part of the work will
analyze how, with the help of the Shannon information inequalities, the bounds given
by Van Dijk will be checked. They are bounds for the information ratio on access
structures defined by graphs with 6 participants. These particular access structures
have the characteristic that their minimal qualified subsets are always compounded
by two participants. Apart from this checking, new bounds for the optimal average
information ratio will be given as well, again using Shannon information inequalities.
One example of a graph defined access structure can be found in Figure 1.3.
In order to understand the idea of secret sharing, there are some previous con-
cepts the reader should become familiar with. For that purpose, a brief introduction
on matroids and polymatroids will be given, followed by an explanation of secret
sharing schemes and access structures along with some important properties. Also,
the linear programs used will be further explored in this preliminary section.
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Chapter 2
Secret Sharing, Matroids and
Polymatroids
2.1 Matroids and Polymatroids
For the whole section, Q will be a finite set and P(Q) will be its power
set, that is, the set of all subsets in Q.
Definition 2.1.1. A polymatroid is a pair S = (Q, f) where f is a map satisfying:
1. f(∅) = 0
2. f is monotone increasing: A ⊆ B ⊆ Q⇒ f(A) ≤ f(B), for every A,B ⊆ Q
3. f is submodular:f(A ∪B) + f(A ∩B) ≤ f(A) + f(B) for every A,B ⊆ Q
Q is called the ground set and f the rank function of S. Moreover, if f is integer
valued, then S is said to be an integer polymatroid.
Definition 2.1.2. A matroid M is an integer polymatroid (Q, r) which rank function
r satisfies the following condition: r(A) ≤ |A|, for all A ⊆ Q. The independent
sets of M are he ones with r(A) = |A| while the dependent sets are the ones with
r(A) < |A|.
Some polymatroids can be obtained from others by applying special operations.
If c ∈ R, c ≥ 0, this implies that cS = (Q, cf) is a polymatroid called multiple of S.
Definition 2.1.3. Let Z = (Q, f) be an integer polymatroid, E be a vector space
over some finite field K and (Vi)i ∈ Q a tuple of subspaces E. Then, if:
f : P(Q) −→ Z,
f(X) = dim
(∑
i∈X
Vi
)
, X ∈ Q
Z is said to be a K-linear polymatroid and (Vi)i ∈ Q is called a K-linear representation
of Z. A K-poly-linear polymatroid is a multiple of a a K-linear polymatroid.
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Figure 2.1: Vamos Matroid.
Figure 2.2: Fano’s Matroid.
Two interesting examples of matroids are the Vamos matroid and the Fano ma-
troid, which are represented in figure 2.1 and in figure 2.2. These pictures give an
idea of both Vamos and Fano’s matroid. They both define a secret sharing scheme
and an access structure. The dependent and independent subsets can be seen as
unauthorized and authorized subsets. For the Vamos matroid, all 3-sets (sets with
3 elements) are independent (which implies that all 2-sets are also independent),
whereas all the subsets with 5 elements are dependent. For the case of subsets with
4 elements they are dependent if the four elements are coplanar in figure 2.1 and
independent if they are not. One can easily see the dependent subsets of the Vamos
matroid as they are the ones that are composed of the vertices conforming the col-
ored faces of the figure. One interesting property of this matroid is that the two top
vertices and the two bottom vertices are not coplanar, while the four middle ones
are (one can see it as the plane generated by the middle vertices is colored, while
the one generated by the top and bottom ones is not). Indeed, that is the reason
why the Vamos matroid is not representable over any field.
With respect to Fano’s matroid, it is actually a representation of the projective
plane of 2 dimensions. All 2-subsets are independent, whereas the 3-subsets are de-
pendent if the vertices composing them are aligned and independent if they are not.
For instance, every side of the triangle in figure 2.2 is dependent, while the vertices
over the small circle are not. It is representable over every field with characteristic
2.
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Figure 2.3: Shannon entropy visual example of a binary random variable.
2.2 Shannon Entropy and Entropic Polymatroids
Definition 2.2.1. Let X be a discrete random variable on the finite set E. The
Shannon entropy of X is
H(X) = −
∑
x∈E
p(x) log p(x),
where p(x) log (p(x)) = 0 if p(x) = 0.
The binary logarithm is taken. The Shannon entropy measures the average
amount of bits necessary to represent the information given by all the possible
events of the variable X. The least probable events result in a bigger logarithm (in
absolute value) which means that they provide more information. However, they
are less probable so they occur less times that the more probable ones. In figure
2.3, one can find a visual interpretation of the Shannon entropy of a binary random
variable. This image depicts the value of the entropy for a random variable with
only 2 events, one with p(x1) = x, and the other with p(x2) = 1 − x. One can see
that the bigger entropy is obtained when p(x1) = p(x2) = 12 , which correspond to
the uniform distribution. On the other hand, one can see that H(X) = 0 when the
probability of one of the events is 1 and the probability of the other is 0. The idea of
Shannon entropy is to know which event will be the upcoming one, so if on has one
event with a high probability and one with a low one, it will be easier to determine
which event will be coming up next than when we have the same probability for all
the events.
Proposition 2.2.2. One interesting property about the Shannon entropy is
0 ≤ H(X) ≤ log |E|
H(X) = 0 when there is one event x0 of the random variable X with probability
p(x0) = 1. On the other side, H(X) = 1 if X follows a uniform distribution, which
means that p(xi) = p(xj) = 1/|E|, for every xi, xj ∈ E
If one considers now X and Y two random variables on the sets E and F ,
respectively, then the entropy of the random variable (X, Y ) on the set E × F is
H(XY ) = −
∑
(x,y)∈ExF
p(x, y) log(p(x, y))
16 CHAPTER 2. SECRET SHARING, MATROIDS AND POLYMATROIDS
Besides, for every y ∈ F , one can consider the random variable X|Y = y on the
set E, which entropy is
H(X|Y = y) = −
∑
x∈E
p(x|y) log (p(x|y))
Definition 2.2.3. Let X be and Y be random variables on the sets E and F . The
conditional entropy of X with respect to Y is:
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
y∈F
p(y)
(∑
x∈E
p(x|y) log(p(x|y))
)
There are also some interesting properties related with the conditional Shannon
entropy that will be useful later on to understand some of the upcoming concepts.
Proposition 2.2.4. For a Discrete random variable X on a set E, the following
properties hold
1. 0 ≤ H(X|Y ) ≤ H(X). Here, H(X|Y ) = 0 if and only if for every y ∈ F ,
there exists an x ∈ E such that p(x|y) = 1, whereas H(X|Y ) = H(X) if and
only if the random variables X and Y are independent.
2. H(XY ) = H(Y ) +H(X|Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X)
There are two other functions that help to understand the relation between Shan-
non entropy and polymatroids, which are the Mutual information and the Condi-
tional Mutual information. These two concepts will be defined here, although they
are explained later in chapter 4.
Definition 2.2.5. Let X and Y in the sets E, F be two (discrete) random variables
and (X, Y ) in the set E ×F another random variable which is distributed according
to the probability function p(x, y). Then the mutual information of X and Y is
I(X;Y ) =
∑
(x,y)∈E×F
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
= H(X)−H(X|Y )
= H(Y )−H(Y |X)
= H(X) +H(Y )−H(XY )
Definition 2.2.6. The conditional mutual information of two random variables
X, Y given the value of a third Z is defined as:
I(XY |Z) = H(XZ) +H(Y Z)−H(XY Z)−H(Z) = H(X|Z)−H(X|Y Z)
Proposition 2.2.7.
I(XY |Z) ≥ 0
where X, Y, Z are random variables.
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These are the most important properties related to Shannon entropy and they
explain the connection between such entropy and polymatroids. Consider now a
random vector (Si)i ∈ Q, Si ∈ Ei, where Ei is the support of the random variable
Si. For every A ⊆ Q, the variable SA denotes the random variable (Si)i ∈ A on the
set
∏
i∈AEi and H(SA) will denote its Shannon entropy. It was Fujishige [27, 28]
who found the relation between such entropy and polymatroids, as stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.2.8. Let (Si)i ∈ Q be a family of random variables. Consider the map-
ping h : P (Q) −→ R, defined by h(∅) = 0 and h(A) = H(SA), for all A ⊆ Q,A 6= ∅.
Then h is the rank function of a polymatroid with ground set Q.
As a consequence of this last theorem, one can now use a family of discrete
random variables to represent a polymatroid. This will define a new type of poly-
matroids.
Definition 2.2.9. A polymatroid S = (Q, f) is said to be entropic if there exists
(Si)i ∈ Q a family of discrete random variables such that h(A) = H(SA), for every
A ⊆ Q.
Theorem 2.2.10. Let K be a finite field and S = (Q, f) a K-linear polymatroid. If
one takes c = log |K|, then S2 = (Q, cf) is an entropic polymatroid, which means
that, in particular, every poly-linear polymatroid is entropic.
Before proving this last theorem, it is necessary to define a special type of families
of discrete random variables, the ones defined by linear maps
Definition 2.2.11. Consider a finite field K, a family (Ei)i ∈ Q of K-vector spaces
and an injective K-linear map:
pi : E −→
∏
i∈Q
Ei
such that the induced linear maps pii : E −→ Ei are surjective. By taking the uniform
probability distribution on E, these linear maps define a random variable Si ∈ Ei,
for every i ∈ Q. A random vector (Si)i ∈ Q that can be defined like this is said to be
K-linear.
Proof. Consider aK-linear random vector (Si)i ∈ Q. If, for every A ⊆ Q one considers
the linear map piA : E −→
∏
i∈AEi, defined by piA(x) = pii(x)i∈A, then it is clear
that:
H(SA) = rank piA log(|K|) = (dimE − dim ker(piA)) log(|K|)
Now, for every i ∈ Q consider Wi = kerpii and its orthogonal subspace Vi = W⊥i ⊆
E∗. The collection (Vi)i ∈ Q of subspaces define a K-linear integer polymatroid Z
= (Q, f) with:
f(A) = dim
∑
i∈A
Vi = dimE − dim
(∑
i∈A
Vi
)⊥
= dimE − dim∩i∈AWi.
Finally, as kerpiA = ∩i∈A kerpii:
f(A) = dimE − dim ker piA = H(SA)
log(|K|)
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Because of the last equality, one has that h(A) = log(|K|)f(A) = cf(A) = H(SA)
for every A ∈ Q, and hence the polymatroid S = (Q, cf) is poly-entropic.
The previous results and definitions provide a small introduction to matroids and
polymatroids, which could be considered as the containers for the elements included
in a secret sharing scheme. However, in order to understand the process involved in
secret sharing, one needs to know some other concepts as well.
2.3 Secret Sharing Schemes and Access Structures
Definition 2.3.1. An access structure Γ is a monotone increasing set of subsets of
P , the set of participants. It is determined by the minimal family of subsets min Γ
that are qualified
Γ = min{B ∈ Q : H(S0|SB) = 0}
Definition 2.3.2. If Γ = (A), A ∈ P(Q), is an access structure, the dual access
structure of Γ is Γ∗ = (Ac) defined on the same set Q as
Γ∗ = {B ∈ P : P \B = B /∈ Γ}
Definition 2.3.3. A perfect secret sharing scheme is a family of random variables
(Si)i ∈ Q with support sets (Ei)i ∈ Q such that:
1. A ∈ Γ (A is a qualified subset) if H(S0|SA) = 0.
2. B /∈ Γ (B is an unqualified subset) if H(S0|SB) = H(S0).
for every A,B ⊆ Q, ground set. S0 corresponds to the random variable that is related
to the dealer, p0
One could understand a secret sharing scheme as a method for distributing a
secret value among a set of participants P in a way that only some subsets of
participants, the qualified subsets, are able to recover the secret value by combining
their shares (piece of information each of them receives). A secret sharing scheme
is called perfect if the non-qualified subsets of participants cannot have any more
information about the secret that could have an outsider to the secret sharing scheme
(and thus, they are not only unqualified but also forbidden). Non-perfect secret
sharing schemes are also studied by some authors, but they will be not treated in
this work for simplification purposes. All the concepts presented in this chapter are
defined only for perfect secret sharing schemes.
Definition 2.3.4. An access structure is connected if every participant x ∈ P is in
a minimal qualified set. If Γ is connected, then Γ∗ is connected.
Definition 2.3.5. The information ratio and average information ratio of a secret
sharing scheme Σ = (Si)i ∈ Q are represented as σ(Σ) and σ˜(Σ), and they are defined
as the (average) maximum relation of length of the shares related to the length of
the secret
σ(Σ) =
max{H(Si) : i ∈ Q}
H(S0)
σ˜(Σ) =
1
n
∑
i∈Q
H(Si)
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Definition 2.3.6. Let P be a finite set of participants, p0 /∈ P a special element
called the dealer, Q = P ∪ {p0} and. Given a map h : P(Q) −→ R, a secret
sharing scheme Σ on P is a collection of discrete random variables (Si)i ∈ Q such
that h(p0) > 0, where h : P (Q) −→ R, h(∅) = 0 and h(A) = H(SA), for every
A 6= ∅, A ⊆ Q.
Consider S = (Q, f) a polymatroid, and p0 ∈ Q one distinguished element of Q
with f(p0) > 0. Then Γp0(S) is an access structure defined by:
• A = {B ⊆ Q : f(p0|B) = 0}
Besides, if M is a matroid, then Γp0(M) is said to be a a matroid port or, more
specifically, the port of the matroid M at the point p0. To end this sections, two
important parameters will be introduced. These two parameters are used as a
measure of efficiency for a secret sharing scheme, and their optimization is the main
motivation of this work.
2.4 Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
Definition 2.4.1. For a finite field K, a secret sharing scheme Σ = (Si)i ∈ Q is a
K-linear (or simply linear) secret sharing scheme if (Si)i ∈ Q is a K-linear family of
random variables or random vector. The support of the random vector (Si)i ∈ Q are
vector subspaces (Ei)i ∈ Q
In this case, the random variable Sp0 corresponds with the secret value of the
scheme. The information, secret value included, is distributed among all the different
the participants according to the random variables (Si)i ∈ Q. The random variable Si
regulates the information acquired by the participant pi, and Sp0 regulates how the
secret value is distributed throughout the participants. Linear secret sharing schemes
can be represented by matrices. Brickell [22] presented a method for constructing
perfect secret sharing schemes for some access structures that were based on linear
codes.
Definition 2.4.2. Using these concepts, the information ratio of a linear secret
sharing scheme can be defined as
λ(Σ) =
max dimEi
dimE0
Definition 2.4.3. A K-linear secret sharing scheme in which Ei = K, for every
i ∈ Q is called a K-vector space secret sharing scheme
For every collection (pii)i ∈ Q of non-zero linear forms on a K-vector space E and
for every choice of a distinguished participant p0 ∈ Q (which will be the dealer), a
K-vector space secret sharing scheme is generated on P = Q− {p0}. Such schemes
are always perfect. Besides, a set A ⊆ P is qualified if and only if the linear form
pip0 ∈ E∗ (which is the linear form associated to the dealer) is a linear combination
of the linear forms (pii)i ∈ A.
Let Σ be a K-vector space secret sharing scheme and S = (Q, h) its associated
polymatroid. Given a basis of the vector space E consider the matrix G such that
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pi(x) = xG for every x ∈ E. This means that every column of G = (G0|G1| · · · |Gn),
where Gi is a k × ki matrix, corresponds to the linear form pii. The columns of Gi
are linear forms in E (that is, vectors in E∗) and correspond to the vector subspace
Vi, for every i ∈ Q. Gi has as many columns as the dimension of the subspace
Vi. If one considers the matrix representation of a secret sharing scheme, C is a
vector subspace of the vector space E = (E0 × E1 × · · · × En). Every codeword
(s0 × s1 × · · · × sn) ∈ C ⊆ (E0 × E1 × · · · × En) corresponds to a share vector
of the secret sharing scheme (it describes a different distribution of the shares of
the participants). The entry of the codeword given by the dealer, p0, corresponds
to the secret value, and the other entries correspond to the shares that have to
be distributed among the rest of participants (si corresponds to the share of the
participant i). All the linear combinations of words conform the vector subspace C.
In a perfect secret sharing scheme, if a subset of participants is authorized, then the
columns corresponding to the subspaces of the participants included in the subset
generate the columns that correspond to the subspace of the secret value (G0).
G can be see as the generator matrix of a linear code C ⊆ KQ that has length
|Q| = n+ 1. The code defines a K-linear matroid M = (Q̂, r) whose ground set Q̂ is
in one to one correspondence with the columns of G. For that reason Q̂ = ∪i∈QQ̂i,
where |Q̂i| = ki. The integer polymatroid Z = (Q, f) that is defined by the subspaces
(Vi)i ∈ Q can be determined from the matroidM because f(A) = r(∪i∈AQ̂i) for every
A ⊆ Q.
On the other hand, when taking into account the dual code C⊥ of C, it has gen-
erator matrix H = (H0|H1| · · · |Hn) which is the transpose matrix of a parity check
matrix of C. It defines a secret sharing scheme Σ∗ on the same set of participants
as Σ, which is called the dual linear secret sharing scheme of Σ. Besides, the code
C⊥ is a K-linear representation of the dual matroid M∗ = (Q̂, r∗) of M . The access
structure of Σ∗ is Γp0(Z∗), where Z∗ = (Q, f ∗) is the polymatroid defined by:
f ∗(A) = r∗
(⋃
i∈A
Q̂i
)
=
∣∣∣∣∣⋃
i∈A
Q̂i
∣∣∣∣∣− r(Q̂) + r
( ⋃
i∈Q−A
Q̂i
)
=
∑
i∈A
ki − k + f(Q− A)
for every A ⊆ Q. The formula for r∗ is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 2.4.4. If M = (Q, r) matroid and r∗ rank function of M∗ = (Q, r∗),
then r∗(A) = |A| − r(Q) + r(Q− A), for every A ⊆ Q
To illustrate the previous concepts of linear codes and secret sharing schemes
defined by matrices, here is an example (which was taken from Carles Padró lecture
notes): Take Q = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and p0 = 0. Consider a finite field K, the K-vector
space E = K6 and (Ei)i ∈ Q with E0 = E1 = E4 = K2 and E2 = E3 = K3. Then Σ
is a linear secret sharing scheme on P defined by the linear map pi : E −→∏i∈QEi
given by the matrix:
G =

1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0

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Now,if one considers for i ∈ Q = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} vector subspaces Vi ⊆ E∗ repre-
sented by the columns of G. A subset will be qualified if V0 ⊆ (Vi)i ∈ A . It is simple
to check that V0 ⊆ Vi + Vj if {i, j} is one of the following subsets: A1 = {1, 2},
A2 = {2, 3}, A3 = {3, 4} and that V0 ∩ (Vi + Vj) = {0} if {i, j} is any other 2
subset of {1, 2, 3, 4}. This means that the secret sharing scheme defined from the
linear mappings pii is perfect and the minimal qualified subsets in its access structure
are A1, A2, A3. The information ratio, as one can see from the dimensions of the
subspaces (Vi)i ∈ A, is 3/2. It can be seen that the longest shares have length 3 (3
columns are needed to represent the vector subspaces V2 and V3) while the secret has
length 2 (the vector subspace V0 has dimension 2), which means that σ(Γ) = 3/2
because of the definition of σ(Γ).
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Chapter 3
Parameters to be optimized
3.1 State of the Art
One of the most widely used ways of measuring the efficiency of a secret sharing
scheme is the computation of two important parameters that were introduced in the
previous chapter: the information ratio and average information ratio of the scheme.
For a particular access structure, they are defined as the infimum ratio between the
maximum (or average) length of the shares and the length of the secret from all the
different secret sharing schemes for that particular access structure. The maximum,
for the information ratio, and the average, for the average information ratio. This
parameters are represented as σ(Γ) and σ˜(Γ), respectively.
Definition 3.1.1. The information ratio σ(Γ) and average information ratio σ˜(Γ)
of an access structure Γ are defined as
• σ(Γ) = inf{σ(Σ): Σ is a secret sharing scheme for Γ}
• σ(Γ) = inf{σ˜(Σ): Σ is a secret sharing scheme for Γ}
Remember that σ(Σ) and Σ˜(Γ) are defined as:
σ(Σ) =
max{H(Si) : i ∈ Q}
H(S0)
σ˜(Σ) =
1
n
∑
i∈Q
H(Si)
Analogously, the parameters λ(Γ) and λ˜(Γ) are used to represent the (average)
information ratio when taking into account only linear secret sharing schemes and
access structures.
Definition 3.1.2. The information ratio λ(Γ) and average information ratio λ˜(Γ)
of an access structure Γ are defined as
• λ(Γ) = inf{λ(Σ): Σ is a linear secret sharing scheme for Γ}
• λ(Γ) = inf{λ˜(Σ): Σ is a linear secret sharing scheme for Γ}
The following definition is motivated by the connection between secret sharing
schemes and polymatroids.
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Definition 3.1.3. Given S = (Q, f) a polymatroid and p0 ∈ Q
σp0(S) =
max{f(i) : i ∈ Q− {p0}}
f({p0}) σ˜p0(S) =
1
|Q| − 1
∑
i∈Q−{p0}
f({i})
f({p0})
This provides a different characterization of the optimal information ratio
• σ(Γ) = inf{σp0(S): S is a entropic polymatroid with Γ = Γp0(S)}
• σ˜(Γ) = inf{σ˜p0(S): S is a entropic polymatroid with Γ = Γp0(S)}
And then again when considering only linear secret sharing schemes one obtains
poly-linear polymatroids, so the corresponding parameters are
• λ(Γ) = inf{σp0(S): S is a poly-linear polymatroid with Γ = Γp0(S)}
• λ˜(Γ) = inf{σ˜p0(S): S is a poly-linear polymatroid with Γ = Γp0(S)}.
Also, a new parameter can be used in order to obtain lower bounds for σ(Σ)
• κ(Γ) = inf{σp0(S): S is a polymatroid with Γ = Γp0(S)}
• κ˜(Γ) = inf{σ˜p0(S): S is a polymatroid with Γ = Γp0(S)}
These are the parameters for which upper and lower bounds are trying to be found
in this work. By giving the correct upper and lower bounds, one can find the optimal
value of the parameters, which will provide a measure of the efficiency of the schemes.
The optimal value is only completely determined when it is checked that the better
lower bound and upper bound that have been calculated for a secret sharing scheme
are equal. Then, one can conclude that the optimal value of the parameter has been
found.
It could be useful to know the relation between these parameters and their cor-
responding ones in the dual access structure. If Σ is a linear secret sharing scheme
for Γ, one can obtain another linear secret sharing scheme with the same (average)
information for the dual access structure Γ∗, which means that λ(Γ∗) = λ(Γ) and
λ˜(Γ∗) = λ˜(Γ). It was proved in [25] that κ(Γ∗) = κ(Γ) as well, and by using the
same arguments, one can find out that κ˜(Γ∗) = κ˜(Γ). Nevertheless, the behavior of
σ, σ˜ with respect to duality is yet unknown.
Taking a closer look to the definition of the aforementioned parameters, one can
find some relations between them:
1. 1 ≤ κ(Γ) ≤ σ(Γ) ≤ λ(Γ)
2. 1 ≤ κ˜(Γ) ≤ σ˜(Γ) ≤ λ˜(Γ)
For every perfect access structure Γ. This technique has some limitations, though.
The value of κ(Γ) is bounded by Theorem 3.1.5. Before stating the theorem, a small
proposition is needed in order to prove it
Proposition 3.1.4. Let Γ be an access structure on a set P and S ′ = (P, f) a
polymatroid with ground set P . S ′ can be extended to a polymatroid S = (Q, f)
with f(p0) = 1 such that S \ {p0} = S ′ and Γ = Γp0(S) if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied
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1. If A ⊆ B ⊆ P are such that A /∈ Γ and B ∈ Γ, then f(A) ≤ f(B)− 1.
2. If A,B ∈ Γ and A ∩B /∈ Γ, then f(A ∪B) + f(A ∩B) ≤ f(A) + f(B)− 1.
Even though it has been proved that there exists a secret sharing scheme for
every access structure [37], the problem when studying general families of access
structures is that length of the shares grow exponentially with the number of partic-
ipants. The main opinion among the researchers in this field is that this problem is
unavoidable. The best known asymptotical lower bounds were given by Csirmaz [11],
who presented a family of access structures on an arbitrary number of participants
n that had shares of length Ω(n/ log n)×length of the secret. Several other papers
have worked in the search for lower bounds using the same technique [8, 17, 11, 24].
However, a negative result was proved in [11]. Csirmaz proved that the bounds
obtained with this method using the conditions of access structure and the Shannon
entropy constraints are, at most, linear in the number of participants.
Theorem 3.1.5. If Γ is an access structure on a set of n participants, then κ(Γ) ≤ n
Proof. For a set P with |P | = n, consider the polymatroid S ′ = (P, f) defined by
f(X) = n+(n−1)+ · · · (n− (k−1)) if |X| = k, for every X ⊆ P . This polymatroid
satisfies the conditions in Proposition 3.1.4 for every access structure Γ and hence,
there exists a polymatroid with σ(Γ) = n for every Γ.
That is why, as it is explained in the next chapter, several non-Shannon informa-
tion inequalities are included in this work in order to find better bounds. The first
non-Shannon information inequalities were presented by Zhang and Yeung [36].
The linear programs used in this combinatorial method can also be improved by
using rank inequalities, which apply to the joint entropies of collections of random
variables defined from linear maps. The first rank inequality that cannot be derived
from Shannon information inequalities was found by Ingleton [21]. The use of such
rank inequalities improved the known lower bounds on the information ratio of
linear secret sharing schemes for some particular families of access structures [13,
29]. It is important to remark that some difficulties arise when using non-Shannon
information inequalities. On the one hand, only a few methods to derive rank and
information inequalities are known and the general opinion is that many of them
remain unknown. On the other hand, no spanning sets for the information or rank
inequalities on a given number of variables are known. Even for four participants,
there are a lot of independent information inequalities.
The negative result discovered by Csirmaz was generalized by Beimel and Orlov
[30] who presented another negative result about the power of non-Shannon informa-
tion inequalities to provide better lower bounds on the information ratio. Basically,
they proved that the lower bounds that can be obtained by considering all the in-
formation inequalities in four or more variables that are known up to date are at
most linear on the number of participants.
Another negative result was presented in [38] by Sebastià Martń, Carles Padró
and An Yang who proved that by using information inequalities with a constant
number of variables only polynomial lower bounds are obtained.
Nevertheless, the polymatroid technique (finding lower bounds on κ(Γ), due to
the construction and definition of the linear programs used to find such bounds) has
been very helpful when studying some families of access structures. It is especially
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useful for access structures with a small number of participants, as the ones consid-
ered in this work (5 and 6 participants only). This is the reason why the method has
been used in several other works to compute lower bounds on the information ratio
[23, 15]. Despite the fact that the same technique is used here, the main difference
between those articles and this work is that here the linear programs are not solved
manually. Instead, some programs are created in Python and those programs are
used to compute the value of the bounds. Obviously this consideration increases
the precision when calculating the bounds as the human factor is removed from the
equation. These programs have been used both to check the results given so far and
to find some new ones by including some non-Shannon information inequalities.
The upper bounds are obtained by finding a secret sharing scheme with the
desired σ or λ (which means that the information ratio can be smaller, but not
higher, as it is by definition, the infimum of the information ratios among all the
secret sharing schemes that have Γ as access structure). This secret sharing scheme
is usually found by using the decomposition method presented by Stinson [33], which
results in linear secret sharing schemes (bounds for λ).
3.2 Improving the linear programming approach to
the optimization of the information ratio
As it has been mentioned at the end of the last section, lower bounds given for σ(Γ)
are in fact lower bounds in κ(Γ). Bounds on both κ(Γ) and κ˜(Γ) can be obtained by
solving a linear programming problem. The fact that κ(Γ) ≤ σ(Γ) means that lower
bounds on κ(Γ) are also lower bounds for σ(Γ). Let S = (Q, f) be a polymatroid and
P = Q − {p0} be its set of participants, with |P | = n. By reordering the elements
of P , one can see the rank function f as a vector f = (f(A))A⊆Q ∈ Rk, where
k = |P(Q)| = 2|Q| = 2n+1. Imposing that S has to be a Γ-polymatroid (Γ = Γp0(S))
some linear constraints are obtained for f . Besides, σ˜p0(S) is linear over the vector
f , which means that κ˜(Γ) can be determined by solving:
Minimize ( 1
n
)
∑
i∈P f({i})
subject to f rank function of a Γ-polymatroid. This can be translated into:
1. f({p0}) = 1
2. S = (Q, f) polymatroid
3. Γ = Γp0(S)
On the other hand, σp0(S) is not linear on the vector f , which means that an
auxiliary linear vector is needed in order to compute a linear problem to obtain the
value of κ(Γ) :
Minimize v
subject to f rank function of a Γ-polymatroid
v ≥ f({i}), for all i ∈ Q
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The main issue with these linear problems is that both the number of variables and
the number of constraints are exponential on the number of participants. They can
only be efficiently computed for access structures with a small number of partici-
pants. The feasible regions Ω and Ω′ from the first and second problem are:
1. Ω = Ω(Γ) = {f ∈ Rk : f is the rank function of a Γ-polymatroid}
2. Ω′ = Ω′(Γ) = {(f, v) ∈ Rk+1 : f ∈ Ω and v ≥ f({i}) for every i ∈ Q}
As there is a Γ-polymatroid for every access structure, both regions are feasible and
bounded, which means that κ(Γ) = min{σp0(S): S is a Γ-polmatroid} and that κ(Γ)
is a rational number. The same applies for κ˜(Γ).
The main issue with these linear programs is the great amount of variables and
constraints needed in order to solve them, so it may be a good idea to reduce the
number of constraints. It can be achieved by using different techniques, such as:
1. Matúš [27] gave a characterization of polymatroids that helps to make the
problem simpler by reducing the number of constraints that define these fea-
sible regions:
f : P(Q) −→ R is the rank function of a polymatroid wih ground set Q if and
only if:
(a) f(∅) = 0
(b) f(Q− {i}) ≤ f(Q), for every i ∈ Q
(c) f(A ∪ {i}) + f(A ∪ {j}) ≥ f(A ∪ {i, j}) + f(A), for every i, j ∈ Q, i 6= j
and for all A ⊆ Q− {i, j}
2. S = (Q, f) is a Γ−polymatroid if and only if:
(a) f({p0}) = 1
(b) f(A ∪ {p0}) = f(A) for every A ⊆ P is a minimal qualified subset of Γ.
(c) f(B ∪ {p0}) = f(B) + 1, for every B ⊆ P maximal unqualified subset of
Γ.
The second part will be used in this work in order to reduce the number of
constraints of the linear programs. These conditions can be resumed by considering,
for every A ⊆ Q, vectors eA ∈ Rk with eA(A) = 1 and eA(B) = 0, for all B ∈
P(Q) − {A}. The feasible reagion Ω can then be defined by the following set of
linear constraints:
• et∅f = 0
• (eQ−{i} − eQ)tf ≤ 0, for every i ∈ Q
• (eA∪{i,j}+ eA− eA∪{i}− eA∪{j})tf ≤ 0, for every {i, j} ∈ Q and A ⊆ Q−{i, j}
• et{p0}f = 1
• (eA∪{p0} − eA)tf = 0, for every A ∈ min(Γ)
• (eB∪{p0} − eB)tf = 1, for every B maximal unqualified subset of Γ
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Chapter 4
New approach for calculating the
bounds
The optimal (average) information ratio, σ(Γ) and σ˜(Γ), were first calculated by
Jackson and Martin [24] for almost all access structures on 5 participants. The
techniques they used provided lower bounds on κ(Γ) and upper bounds on λ(Γ).
The value of σ(Γ) is exactly determined if and only if these bounds imply that
κ(Γ) = λ(Γ), and the same occurs with σ˜(Γ), κ˜(Γ) and λ˜(Γ). Because of that, the
results obtained for an access structure apply as well to its dual access structure,
which reduces the number of cases to be studied.
In this paper, the lower bounds calculated in [24] have been checked with the
help of some linear programs programmed in Python. Actually, they are solved using
Sage solver, but the API of Sage in Python is used to simplify the implementation
and comprehension of the programs. Using the Shannon information inequalities
and the conditions of access structure, a mixed integer linear program was solved
using GLP (Sage is included in this package). GLP is the linear programming kit
provided by GNU (Linux) to solve linear problems. It uses simplex method in order
to solve the problem. Further information on the simplex method can be found in
[39, 40]. In order to use Sage, one needs a virtual machine, such as Virtual Box,
and also an already mounted Sage operating system. It can be easily found how
to download both of them on the Internet. Two programs have been created to
initialize the constraints of the problem. The first one is used to calculate bounds
on σ(λ) by creating an auxiliary variable such that the objective function is to solve
min(v) where f(pi) ≤ v, for every i ∈ Q. The second one calculates the value of σ˜(λ)
using a similar strategy, but now the constraint in v is changed to
∑
i∈Q f(pi) ≤ v.
In the end, the value obtained from the solution of the program has to be divided
by the number of participants in order to to get the correct bound for σ˜(λ).
Some of the bounds obtained in [24] were improved by Carles Padró, Leonor
Vàzquez and An Yang in [29] by using the same approach that has been used in
this work. Actually, they were able to improve some bounds on σ˜(λ) but not on
σ(λ). Nevertheless, they found the exact value of κ(Γ) and κ˜(λ) which means that
no better lower bounds can be obtained by the combinatorial techniques that have
been used so far. These bounds can only be updated by either considering additional
information or rank inequalities other than the basic Shannon inequalities (such as
Ingleton’s inequality, for the lower bounds) or by obtaining better constructions of
secret sharing schemes for those access structures (upper bounds).
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4.1 Non-Shannon Information Inequalities
The lower bounds obtained so far for κ(Γ) and for κ˜(Γ) are not tight in general.
This is due to the existence of the so called Non-Shannon information inequali-
ties. The polymatroids axioms correspond to the Shannon information inequalities.
These axioms together with the conditions of being an access structure conform
the restrictions that have been used up to now. However, many other information
inequalities have been found lately. First, a reminder on mutual information and
conditional mutual information of two random variables will be given.
Definition 4.1.1. The mutual information of two random variables X and Y sup-
ported on the sets E and F , respectively, is
I(X;Y ) =
∑
(x,y)∈E×F
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
= H(X)−H(X|Y )
= H(Y )−H(Y |X)
= H(X) +H(Y )−H(XY )
Definition 4.1.2. The conditional mutual information of two random variables
X, Y given the value of a third Z is defined as:
I(XY |Z) = H(XZ) +H(Y Z)−H(XY Z)−H(Z) = H(X|Z)−H(X|Y Z)
All the inequalities that can be derived from the expression:
∑
i∈Q
αiI(AiBi|Ci)
are the Shannon information inequalities. The inequalities regarding 3 or less ran-
dom variables are all Shannon type. On the other hand, any non-trivial inequality
that cannot be obtained as a linear combination of the expression for the conditional
mutual information are said to be non-Shannon type information inequalities. For
example, Randall Dougherty, Christopher Freiling and Kenneth Zeger [18] improved
some of the lower bounds given by Jackson and Martin in [24] by effectively adding
some non-Shannon inequalities.
One example of the inequalities they included (which is a Non-Shannon infor-
mation inequality) is:
I(A,B) ≤I(A;R|D) + I(D;R|B;C) + I(B;C|A;R) + I(B;C|D)
+ I(A;C|B;R) + I(A;B|C;R) + I(A;B|C)
By using these Non-Shannon type information inequalities one can improve the
lower bounds on κ(Γ) and therefore better lower bounds on σ(Γ) are achieved. In
particular, the idea behind Ingleton’s inequality has been used in this work as an
additional constraint to the linear programs that could provide better lower bounds
on λ(Γ). The following notation has to be introduced in order to understand the
next concepts: f(X|Y ) = f(X ∪ Y )− f(Y ).
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Lemma 4.1.3. If f is the rank function a Γ-polymatroid, then:
f({b}|{c, d})− f({b}|{a, c}) + f({d}|{a}) ≥ 0, (4.1)
for every a, b, c, d ∈ Q ground set.
Proof. Let S = (Q, f) be a polymatroid with rank function f and ground set Q.
Then, if f is the rank function of a polymatroid it is submodular by definition, which
means that:
1. f(A) ≥ 0, for every A ⊆ Q
2. f(X|Y ) ≥ f(X|Y ∪ Z), for every X, Y, Z ⊆ Q
and hence
f({b}|{c, d})− f({b}|{a, c}) + f({d}|{a})
≥ f({b}|{a, c, d})− f({b}|{a, c}) + f({d}|{a, c})
= f({b, d}|{a, c})− f({b}|{a, c}) ≥ 0
Lemma 4.1.4. If f is the rank function of a polymatroid, then:
f({e}) ≥f({a}|{c})− f({a}|{b, c}) + f({a}|{d})− f({a}|{b, d})+
+ f({c})− f({c}|{d}) + 2f({e}|{a}) + 2f({e}|{a, b}) (4.2)
for every five elements a, b, c, d, e ∈ Q.
Proof. By applying lemma 4.1.3 to the previous formula, one can see that:
1. f({e}|{b})− f({a}|{b, c}) ≥ −f({a}|{c, e})
2. f({e}|{b})− f({a}|{b, d}) ≥ −f({a}|{d, e})
Due to those two inequalities, the second term of the inequality, which will be
referenced as α1, obeys:
α1 ≥f({a}|{c})− f({a}|{c, e}) + f({a}|{d})− f({a}|{d, e})+
+ f({c})− f({c}|{d}) + 2f({e}|{a}) = α2
By reordering the elements a, b, c, d, e in the inequality and using the lemma 4.1.3
twice again on α2, one obtains:
α2 =f({e}|{c})− f({e}|{a, c}) + f({e}|{d})− f({e}|{a, d})+
+ f({c})− f({c}|{d}) + 2f({a}|{e})
α2 ≥ f({e}|{c}) + f({e}|{d}) + f({c})− f({c}|{d}) = α3
Finally, applying lemma 4.1.3 one last time one gets:
α3 = f({e}|{c}) + f({c})− f({c}|{e})
= f({e} ∪ {c})− f({c}) + f({c})− f({e} ∪ {c}) + f({e})
= f({e})
and the proof is concluded.
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Figure 4.1: Relation between Shannon and non-Shannon information inequalities.
Definition 4.1.5. Consider S = (Q, f) a polymatroid and A,B,C,D ⊆ Q. Then,
I(f ;A,B,C,D) = f(A) + f(B) + f(C ∪D) + f(A ∪B ∪ C) + f(A ∪B ∪D)−
− f(A ∪B)− f(A ∪ C)− f(A ∪D)− f(B ∪ C)− f(B ∪D)
(4.3)
Ingleton’s inequality states that if S = (Q, f) poly-linear polymatroid, then
I(f ;A,B,C,D) ≤ 0, for every A,B,C,D ⊆ Q.
Moreover, according to [10], S = (Q, f) poly-linear polymatroid if and only if
I(f ;A ∪ X,B ∪ X,C ∪ X,D ∪ X) ≤ 0, for every A,B,C,D ⊆ Q disjoint and
non-empty sets. In Figure 4.1, one can see a visual example of the relation between
Shannon inequalities and Ingleton’s inequality.
Proof. The proof will be done for elements in the ground set and can be generalized
to subsets of the ground set. It can be assumed that that S is K-linear for some
field K. Take (Vi)1 ≤ i ≤ 4 a K-linear representation of S and V5 = V1 ∩ V2. Consider
now Ŝ = (Q̂, f) with Q̂ = Q ∪ {x5} represented by (Vi)1 ≤ i ≤ 5. Then:
f({x5}|{x1}) = f({x5}|{x2}) = 0
f({x5}) = f({x1})− f({x1}|{x2}
By applying lemma 4.1.4, one gets:
f({x1})− f({x1}|{x2})− f({x1}|{x3}) + f({x1}|{x2, x3})− f({x1}|{x4})+
+ f({x1}|{x2, x4})− f({x3}) + f({x3}|{x4} ≤ 0
Expanding the previous expression, one has:
f({x1})− (f({x1, x2})− f({x2}))− (f({x1, x3})− f({x3}))+
+ (f({x1, x2, x3})− f({x2, x3}))− (f({x1, x4})− f({x4}))+
+ (f({x1, x2, x4})− f({x2, x4}))− f({x3}) + (f({x3, x4})− f({x4}))
= f({x1}) + f({x2}) + f({x1, x2, x3}) + f({x1, x2, x4}) + f({x3, x4})−
− f({x1, x2})− f({x1, x3})− f({x2, x3})− f({x1, x1})− f({x2, x4})
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which is the expression for the Ingleton’s inequality for every 4 elements of the
ground set Q. Using the same strategy with subsets instead of elements in the
ground set, the proof is concluded.
Ingleton’s inequality was the first attempt of adding new restrictions in this work.
For an access structure Γ one can consider the following linear program:
Minimize v
subject to f rank function of a Γ-polymatroid.
I(f ;A∪X,B ∪X,C ∪X,D ∪X) ≤ 0, for every A,B,C,D ⊆ Q disjoint
and non-empty sets.
v ≥ f({i})∀i ∈ Q
As there exists a Secret sharing scheme for every Γ access structure [37], the
linear program is feasible and bounded. Because it defines linear secret sharing
schemes, the solution is a lower bound on λ(Γ). In fact, it is the best lower bound
on λ(Γ) that can be obtained by adding only the Ingleton inequality to the Shannon
information inequalities.
However, this information inequality did not work properly with the rest of the
restrictions used in the linear programs created for the purpose of this paper, so a
similar strategy was used instead. As it has been shown in the proof of the inequality,
a new variable can be defined in order to represent the intersection of two different
subsets, say V1∩V2. So, whenever it was needed to include any bound regarding the
intersection of vector subspaces (when using non-Shannon information inequalities),
a new variable is defined which will be equal to the intersection of such subsets.
As Ingleton inequality, this approach can only be applied to linear secret sharing
schemes, so in this case, by using this technique one is obtaining lower bounds on
λ(Γ).
Let M = (Q, h) be a linear matroid and Σ a linear secret sharing scheme. The
following mapping can be considered:
Participants : i −−−−−−−−→ Vi ⊆ V
j −−−−−−−−→ Vj ⊆ V, V ⊆ Fr
One may want to include a new constraints based on non-Shannon information
inequalities, such as:
h(i) + h(j) ≥ h(i, j),
which is the same thing as to say:
dim(Vi) + dim(Vj) ≥ dim(Vi + Vj).
And it is known that the last inequality is satisfied by every two vector subspaces
due to Grassmann equality:
dim(Vi) + dim(Vj) = dim(Vi + Vj) + dim(Vi ∩ Vj),
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But intersections cannot be easily imposed in our linear programs. The solution
to this problem was, in this case, to declare an auxiliary variable called V6 such
that V6 = V1 ∩ V2. Using this new auxiliary participant new bounds in λ(Γ) were
found. The conditions above are translated accordingly to the definition of the new
variable.
h(1) + h(2) = h(1, 2) + h(6)
h(1) = h(1, 6)
h(2) = h(2, 6)
}
≡
{
dim(V1) = dim(V1 + V6) = dim(V1 + V1 ∩ V2)
dim(V1) = dim(V1 + V6) = dim(V1 + V1 ∩ V2)
This has to be done for every subset intersection one wants to include in the restric-
tions of the problem. Every new intersection means a new auxiliary participant.
Remember that the number of constraints and the number of variables are expo-
nential on the number of participants, so these operations increase quite a lot the
computational cost of the program.
This technique was used in [29] by Carles Padró, Leonor Vàzquez and An Yang
to improve some of the bounds given by Jackson and Martin in [23]. In particular,
they could improve the bounds on the following access structures: Γ73, Γ80, Γ82, Γ83,
Γ86, Γ88, Γ89, Γ150, Γ152, and Γ153. For these access structures, it has been possible
to find better bounds for some of the ones in Table 4.1, but only for σ(Γ) and not
for σ˜(Γ). For the rest of the access structures, no better lower bounds have been
obtained. However, it has been found some secret sharing scheme on Γ that has the
lower bound as information ratio for each of the remaining access structures, which
means that upper and lower bound are the same and the optimum value for σ(Γ)
has been found. In conclusion the optimal information ratio of Γ80, Γ82, Γ83, Γ86,
Γ88, Γ89 has been found. Some other results have been found for σ˜(Γ). For access
structures Γ73, Γ152 and Γ153 the optimal information ratio has been found. It has
been checked that: σ˜(Γ73) = σ˜(Γ153) = 3/2 and σ˜(Γ152) = 7/5.
Furthermore, for the still open access structures, the technique explained before
has been used. This approach results in linear secret sharing schemes and hence,
lower bounds on λ(Γ). In Table 4.2, one can find the updated results (lower bounds)
that have been found by using this technique, that is, by including additional vari-
ables in the programs in order to consider subset intersections.
Table 4.1: Updated bounds on σ(Γ) of open access structures with 5 participants
Access structure σ from [23] σ from [29] σ˜ from [29] updated LB for σ
Γ73 ∼= Γ∗151 [3/2, 5/3] 3/2 [3/2, 8/5] 14/9
Γ150 ∼= Γ∗40 [3/2, 12/7] 3/2 7/5 No improvement
Γ152 ∼= Γ∗53 [3/2, 5/3] 3/2 [3/2, 8/5] 14/9
Γ153 ∼= Γ∗30 [3/2, 5/3] 3/2 [7/5, 8/5] No improvement
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Figure 4.2: Graph access structures on 8 participants with κ(Γ) < λ(Γ).
Table 4.2: Updated bounds on λ(Γ) of open access structures with 5 participants
Access structure σ from [23] σ from [29] σ˜ from [29] LB λ with LP LB λ˜ with LP
Γ73 ∼= Γ∗151 [3/2, 5/3] 3/2 [3/2, 8/5] 5/3 23/15
Γ150 ∼= Γ∗40 [3/2, 12/7] 3/2 7/5 5/3 No improvement
Γ152 ∼= Γ∗53 [3/2, 5/3] 3/2 [3/2, 8/5] 5/3 No improvement
Γ153 ∼= Γ∗30 [3/2, 5/3] 3/2 [7/5, 8/5] 5/3 No improvement
All of the explained before can make one think that the bounds for σ(Γ) and
σ˜(Γ) given by the bounds obtained for κ(Γ) and κ˜(Γ) are tight. But, in general,
they are not. In fact, some access structures have been found with κ(Γ) < σ(Γ)
or with κ(Γ) < λ(Γ). The bounds for these particular access structures can be
improved by effectively adding some rank or information inequalities that cannot
be derived from Shannon information inequalities. For example in [29], the three
graph based access structures on 8 participants in Fig 4.2 were studied. By adding
the Ingleton inequality (using the technique of the subset intersection explained
before) to the aforementioned linear programs, bounds on λ(Γ) were found. Carles
Padró, Leonor Vázquez and An Yang found out that the bound for λ(Γ) > κ(Γ),
which means that κ(Γ) < λ(Γ) for those three access structures. In particular,
they obtained λ(Γ1) ≥ 19/10 and λ(Γ2), λ(Γ3) ≥ 13/7, while κ(Γ1) = 11/6 and
κ(Γ2) = κ(Γ3) = 9/5.
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Chapter 5
Access structures based on graphs
Finally, as it was presented in the Introduction chapter, access structures on 6
participants based on graphs are going to be considered. The aim of this chapter
is to check the lower bounds given by Van Dijk [15] for 112 graph-based access
structures by using the same linear programs explained so far. In fact, he calculated
lower bounds for the optimal information ratio, and not or the average optimal
information ratio. So, bounds on σ˜(Γ) are going to be calculated as well.
The same approach is followed when calculating these bounds on graph-based
access structures as the one that has been explained in the chapter before. Basically,
Shannon information inequalities will be used in order to check the existing bounds
and calculate the new ones. In the following table, one can find the results obtained
for both σ(Γ) and σ˜(Γ) for all the graph based access structures presented by Van
Dijk [15].
Table 5.1: Lower bounds obtained with LP for σ(Γ) and σ˜(Γ)
Nr. σ from [15] σ LP σ˜ LP Nr σ from [15] σ LP σ˜ LP
1 1 1 1 57 3/2 3/2 3/2
2 3/2 3/2 7/6 58 3/2 3/2 4/3
3 3/2 3/2 7/6 59** 3/2 3/2 3/2
4 5/3 5/3 4/3 60 3/2 3/2 3/2
5 3/2 3/2 7/6 61 5/3 7/4∗ 3/2
6 3/2 3/2 4/3 62** 3/2 3/2 4/3
7 3/2 3/2 7/6 63 3/2 3/2 7/6
8 3/2 3/2 5/4 64 3/2 3/2 7/6
9 5/3 7/4∗ 11/8 65 3/2 3/2 4/3
10 5/3 5/3 4/3 66 1 1 1
11 3/2 3/2 7/6 67 3/2 3/2 4/3
12 3/2 3/2 4/3 68 3/2 3/2 3/2
13 5/3 5/3 4/3 69 3/2 3/2 7/6
14 5/3 5/3 4/3 70** 3/2 3/2 4/3
15 3/2 3/2 7/6 71** 3/2 3/2 4/3
16 3/2 3/2 4/3 72 3/2 3/2 4/3
17 3/2 3/2 7/6 73 3/2 3/2 4/3
18 5/3 5/3 3/2 74 3/2 3/2 4/3
19 3/2 3/2 3/2 75** 3/2 3/2 3/2
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Table 5.1: Lower bounds obtained with LP for σ(Γ) and σ˜(Γ)
Nr. σ from [15] σ LP σ˜ LP Nr σ from [15] σ LP σ˜ LP
20 3/2 3/2 7/6 76 3/2 3/2 3/2
21 3/2 3/2 4/3 77** 3/2 3/2 3/2
22 5/3 7/4∗ 4/3 78 3/2 3/2 3/2
23 3/2 3/2 7/6 79 3/2 3/2 3/2
24 5/3 5/3 4/3 80 1 1 1
25 5/3 5/3 4/3 81 3/2 3/2 7/6
26 5/3 5/3 4/3 82 3/2 3/2 7/6
27 3/2 3/2 7/6 83 3/2 3/2 4/3
28 3/2 3/2 7/6 84** 3/2 3/2 17/12
29 5/3 5/3 4/3 85 3/2 3/2 4/3
30 3/2 3/2 7/6 86 3/2 3/2 4/3
31 5/3 5/3 3/2 87 3/2 3/2 4/3
32 3/2 3/2 7/6 88 3/2 3/2 4/3
33 3/2 3/2 4/3 89 3/2 3/2 4/3
34 3/2 3/2 7/6 90 3/2 3/2 3/2
35 3/2 3/2 4/3 91** 3/2 3/2 3/2
36 3/2 3/2 4/3 92 3/2 3/2 4/3
37** 3/2 3/2 3/2 93** 3/2 3/2 3/2
38 3/2 3/2 3/2 94 3/2 3/2 4/3
39 3/2 3/2 7/6 95 3/2 3/2 7/6
40 5/3 7/4∗ 4/3 96 3/2 3/2 4/3
41 3/2 3/2 7/6 97 3/2 3/2 4/3
42 5/3 7/4∗ 3/2 98 3/2 3/2 4/3
43 5/3 7/4∗ 3/2 99 3/2 3/2 4/3
44 3/2 3/2 7/6 100 1 1 1
45 3/2 3/2 7/6 101 3/2 3/2 3/2
46** 3/2 3/2 4/3 102 3/2 3/2 3/2
47 3/2 3/2 4/3 103 3/2 3/2 3/2
48 5/3 5/3 3/2 104 3/2 3/2 4/3
49 3/2 3/2 4/3 105 1 1 1
50 3/2 3/2 7/6 106 3/2 3/2 3/2
51 3/2 3/2 4/3 107 3/2 3/2 4/3
52 1 1 1 108 1 1 1
53 3/2 3/2 3/2 109 3/2 3/2 4/3
54 3/2 3/2 4/3 110 1 1 1
55** 3/2 3/2 4/3 111 1 1 1
56 3/2 3/2 7/6 112 1 1 1
The bounds that have been updated with respect to the ones given by Van
Dijk [15] are marked with a ∗. These bounds were actually found in [29] and, as
the same linear programs have been used, one can see that the same bounds have
been updated with the same values. Open access structures are highlighted with
∗∗. Those are the access structures for which new bounds are being looked for. In
fact, from those access structures three have been closed: It has been determined
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that σ(Γ37) = σ(Γ46) = σ(Γ62) = 3/2. This means that the value of the optimal
information ratio is achieved and these access structures are closed. The bounds for
the rest of the open access structures are trying to be updated by using some non-
Shannon information inequalities. Remember that the technique explained before is
being used, and hence only bounds on λ(Γ) will be achieved. Some results have been
found lately and can be found in Table 5.2. However, the access structures on that
table are still open and the same technique will be applied with newer constraints in
the search for better bounds. Probably, the information ratio of all of these access
structure on a small number of participants will be effectively calculated in a near
future.
Table 5.2: Lower bounds obtained with LP for λ(Γ) and λ˜(Γ)
Nr. σ from [15] λ LP Nr σ from [15] λ LP
55 3/2 8/5 77 3/2 8/5
59 3/2 8/5 84 3/2 8/5
70 3/2 8/5 91 3/2 8/5
71 3/2 8/5 93 3/2 8/5
75 3/2 8/5
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